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Abstract 
This paper examines the insistent claims by advocates of Evidence-Based Teaching, that it is a 
rigorous scientific approach. The paper questions the view that randomised controlled trials and 
meta-analyses are the only truly scientific methods in educational research. It suggests these claims 
are often based on a rhetorical appeal which relies on too simple a notion of 'science'. Exploring the 
tacit assumptions behind 'evidence-based teaching', the paper identifies an empiricist and 
reductionist philosophy of science, and a failure to recognise the complexity of education and 
pedagogy. Following a discussion of large-scale syntheses of evidence (Hattie's Visible Learning; the 
Education Endowment Foundation’s Teaching and Learning Toolkit), it examines in detail one strand 
of the latter concerning Sports Participation, which is used to illustrate flaws in procedures and the 
failure to take seriously the need for causal explanations.  
Introduction 
Increasingly in recent years, the field of Education has seen strong and indeed dogmatic 
insistence on 'scientific' approaches to evidencing 'what works'. It is the aim of this paper to 
discuss these claims and the posture of its advocates, firstly in general terms and then through 
a detailed examination of how evidence is assembled in one particular study.  It will argue 
that the appeal to 'science' as the model for valid educational research too often depends on a 
superficial vernacular notion of science.  
A hierarchy of approved methodologies is proposed with Randomised Controlled Trials 
(RCTs) set up as the 'gold standard', their conclusions pulled together through a statistical 
synthesis of effect sizes (misleadingly known as 'meta-analysis'). Taking this one stage 
further to what we might call 'meta-meta-analysis', John Hattie (2009) has achieved 
international recognition for his attempt to synthesise over 800 meta-analyses involving 
50,000 research studies. Actions and interventions are then compared on the basis of 
comparative effect sizes. More modestly, the Education Endowment Foundation (EEF) has 
produced a Teaching and Learning Toolkit (Higgins et al. 2014), a comparison of 35 different 
forms of action to evaluate their relative effectiveness in assisting pupils disadvantaged by 
poverty. In this case, the mean effect sizes are translated into months of additional progress, 
ranging from +8 to -4 months. The EEF also commissions many new RCTs.  
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The use of RCTs and meta-analysis is sanctified by appeals to Science in general, including 
more specific demands that teachers should learn from health professionals' adoption of 
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM). Polemical appeals to 'scientific' rigour are circulating in 
various media, genre and spheres of influence. These draw on long established binaries which 
distinguish science as objective knowledge from subjective and even superstitious beliefs 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003:187seq). Subjectivity is regarded as self-indulgent, exaggerating 
the importance of the individual; it uses poetic or rhetorical language which lacks precision, 
and privileges aesthetic, moral and spiritual sensibilities. This binary is at work in the 
'scientific' claim used to give a positive intonation to approved forms of educational research 
(RCTs, meta-analysis). The other side of the binary, for example the discredited pre-scientific 
practices of alchemy or astrology, is used symbolically to designate and discredit other forms 
of research. Thus, some of the most strident advocates have attempted to rubbish other forms 
of research in terms of superstitious practices and beliefs: 
Learning Styles has been been thoroughly debunked. You might as well get out the 
Tarot cards. (Carl Hendrick, cited by Black 2018) 
"Open University, sort out your life. Learning Styles = Magical unicorns" (Tom 
Bennett, ibid) 
It is our contention that these appeals to science use a flawed and stereotyped vernacular 
image or 'folk-view' (Thomas 2012:28) of the natural sciences for rhetorical effect but fail to 
probe sufficiently into the true characteristics of science. The source image captures some of 
the surface features of science without a theoretical understanding of scientific methods. We 
do not intend to be ‘anti scientific’, precisely the opposite: the intention of this paper is to 
demonstrate that many advocates of evidence-based teaching work with too simple a notion 
of 'science', with serious negative consequences. Our argument is that if appeals to science 
are to be used, this should be done critically, avoiding simplistic understanding of science 
which will constrain and distort educational research.  
Limited and reductionist understandings of scientific methods 
The role of experiments 
In this superficial view, science is seen as consisting primarily of experiments, yet many 
scientific fields use few experiments; for example astronomy, meteorology, evolution - 
perhaps even many parts of biology. Moreover, as Thomas (2004:1-6) pointed out, 
experiments are generally used to verify rather than advance knowledge, and many 
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discoveries and inventions have not arisen from systematic procedures (eg penicillin, nylon, 
superconductivity, aeroplanes). Scientific method depends heavily on reflective observation, 
intelligent noticing, trial and error, and even intuition. We cannot, therefore, simply equate 
scientific methods with experiments alone. We should not neglect the diversity of evidence 
which science uses, nor ignore the different stages involved:  
If various stages in the employment of evidence are traversed in moving toward 
knowledge - a bricolage / hunch stage, an inspirational stage, a discovery stage and a 
corroborative / confirmatory stage - the notion of evidence-based practice focuses on 
evidence at the confirmatory stage, on the systematic collation of research studies for 
use by practitioners and policy-makers. (Thomas 2004:10). 
Thomas expands on this more recently (2016:395) by pointing out that, in natural science too, 
we should not get fixated on 'the experimental methods of agriculture, plant science and 
pharmaceutical testing'. Citing Scriven, Thomas argues that 'there are many ways... to go 
about establishing causation beyond reasonable doubt' including 'a range of inferential 
manoeuvres involving trial and error, conjecture, and refutation'  (p398). 
Scriven gives the examples of astrophysics, meteorology and epidemiology, where 
inference about cause follows observation, modelling, and calculation. He proceeds to 
discuss the very different domains of autopsy, geology, and engineering breakdown, 
where practitioners adopt similar processes of conjecture and refutation, making their 
way to conclusions about cause using straightforward heuristics and reasoning. 
(Thomas 2016:398, citing Scriven 2008:22-3) 
Ontological and epistemological levels: the dangers of reductionism 
It is important to make distinctions between different fields of enquiry, which partly relate to 
ontological 'levels'. In natural sciences, distinctions are made between physics, chemistry and 
biology, with physics described as 'lower' than biology. Although physical and chemical 
causes operate in living organisms, the disciplines of physics and chemistry are insufficient 
for an understanding of life processes. Similarly, in education it is possible to contrast two 
different approaches to a memorisation task through RCTs provided the context (students, 
prior learning, etc) is sufficiently stable; however the complexity of teaching in real school 
contexts, bearing in mind the requirement for sustainable cognitive, ethical and aesthetic 
development, exceeds the capacity of this form of research to determine 'what works', how 
and for what benefit.  
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Sayer (2010:5) distinguishes between the physical, chemical, biological and social levels, 
with a possible difference in level between psychological and social events. He condemns 
reductionist attempts to investigate 'higher level' phenomena through 'lower level' scientific 
methods. This does not mean that we can ignore the 'lower levels', as physical or chemical 
powers do not cease to operate in biological or social events.  
We intervene in agriculture at the physical, chemical and biological levels, through 
digging, watering, fertilizing, and weeding, and so on. We cannot intervene merely by 
thinking about agriculture. (Sayer (2010:18) 
Stephen Rose's book Lifelines (2005) analyses reductionism in biology. He does not propose 
abandoning experiments, but places serious warnings:  
Effective experiments demand the artificial controls imposed by the reductive 
methodology of the experimenter, but we must never forget that as a consequence 
they provide at best only a very simplified model, perhaps even a false one, of what 
happens in the blooming, buzzing, interactive confusion of life at large, where things 
rather rarely happen one at a time. (Rose 2005:28)  
Further: 
What happens in the test-tube may be the same, the opposite of, or bear no 
relationship at all to what happens in the living cell, still less the living organism in its 
environment. (p79) 
Steven Rose and Hilary Rose (1976:96-111) are equally concerned about 'biologism', i.e. the 
misuse of biological explanations to account for psychological and social phenomena, for 
example when war is explained as a form of animal aggression or human thought by analogy 
with computer technology. They discuss the real-life consequences of these forms of 
scientific reductionism, including the use of ritalin, behaviourist punishment regimes, and 
beliefs in fixed genetically-determined intelligence, all of which blinker practitioners to the 
complexity of social context and experience. 
It is, therefore, fundamentally unscientific to try to explain social phenomena by applying the 
wrong level of scientific methodology. As we will argue, the use of RCTs in the field of 
education is not only difficult, it is frequently unhelpful and misleading. Further, to try to 
generate theory by amalgamating the results of disparate RCT-style experiments and 
generating an average 'effect size' is fundamentally flawed. Thomas makes this point about 
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education, arguing that 'each procedural domain in every science is highly peculiar, 
depending on its subject's form and texture' (2012:28).  
Emergence and open systems 
This epistemological problem has ontological roots. Although the principles of Newtonian 
mechanics also apply to living beings including humans (we have weight and are subject to 
gravity, for example), they are insufficient to explain features specific to living beings, let 
alone specifically to humans. Life processes entail biochemical reactions, but biochemistry is 
insufficient to deal with various forms of emergence such as growth and development; the 
reciprocal interactions between organisms and environments; and evolutionary change.  
These forms of emergence also apply to human life, but there are further issues when 
considering causality in social studies: the fact that we are semantic, reflective and social 
beings with extensive (though not unlimited) powers to reshape our environments generates 
new forms of emergence beyond those affecting sheep and frogs. Bhaskar, in extending his 
theory of Critical Realism to human sciences and causal explanations, argues that social 
structures have powers that are not just aggregates of individual actions. His succinct 
illustration is that an army is not just the plural of soldier (Bhaskar 1979:34) but depends on 
structures and purposes. Although individual activity is needed to sustain and reproduce 
social structures, the structures inherent in our societies and cultures predate us as 
individuals: 'The social structure... is always already made.' (p42) 
As Bhaskar (1978; 1979) argues 'closed system' explanations are rarely adequate in the 
natural world, and certainly not in social situations. Multiple forces are at work which may 
contradict as well as reinforce each other, and it is rare that a single causal factor or force 
may explain much of what occurs. We also need to consider human volition, habit, 
interpretation and interaction. Consequently, a typical mode of physics experiment or indeed 
RCT, based on the principle of artificially creating a closed situation by stabilising all but two 
variables, is almost impossible to create in social sciences. This has various consequences, 
including the need to reject research methods which cannot handle social complexity, and to 
recognise the limited predictability of educational processes and learning.  
Consequences 
The failure to recognise key human characteristics (agency, volition, intentionality, 
understanding, reflection) leads to pseudo-science which both assumes and promotes less 
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than human behaviour. The classic case is so-called 'scientific management' or Taylorism, 
essentially a technology of control to speed up factory production lines.  
The answer for Taylor was quantification: he used time-and-motion studies to develop 
tables of how many times the average worker could perform a given action in a given 
time, which could then be used to set extensive numerical targets for employees. This 
method depended on breaking down tasks as far as possible into simple, repetitive 
actions... The worker's creative process, a defining characteristic of what makes him 
or her human, is supressed by the need to comply with a template laid down 
elsewhere. (Umney 2018:66)   
The Taylorist reconstruction of work as alienated labour is echoed in pedagogic situations by 
Pavlovian or Skinnerian behaviourism. This 'scientific' psychology assumes a faithful 
resemblance between the learning of captive animals and that of free human beings. It 
sidelines curiosity and cognition, and substitutes simplistic mechanistic stimuli of reward and 
punishment for richer forms of mediation through cultural tools such as language, as in 
Vygotskian theory. As with Taylorism, this assumes and produces a less than human form of 
activity - alienated learning.  The model is inadequate to describe the situation. 
The danger is that, through the drive to make educational research more 'scientific', pupils are 
represented as de-personalised data, described through a set of labels based on measurable 
characteristics. The dynamics of pedagogic interaction are translated into discrete 
'interventions'; the complex lives of young people disappear as they become 'average' 
recipients of learning. The kinds of questions which can be asked or the problems which can 
be addressed are restricted to ones which can be answered through the approved methods and 
the 'scientific' model has become inadequate for the situation. The language of 'scientific 
research' is performative and not simply descriptive.  
Furthermore, there are problems with calculations based on activities which cannot be 
measured directly. Attainment is not like volume, or progress like length or acceleration. 
They can only be input into calculations through proxy measures, which give an incomplete 
picture and may be problematic in terms of construct validity. Repeatability is problematic in 
educational settings, as the other things occurring in pupils' lives cannot be simply pushed 
aside. 
Finally, by privileging a one-dimensional mode of research which eschews the need for 
theory, teachers are effectively discouraged from the kind of pedagogical reflection on 'what 
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works' for their particular pupils, drawing on theory and considering carefully factors which 
might be inhibiting progress.     
Randomised controlled trials in social and educational settings 
The use of RCTs, as social science's analogy to experiments, is the basic building block of 
evidence-based practice. The method has been adopted from drugs trials and other forms of 
RCT in Medicine with insufficient consideration of the difference between the fields. Since 
this has argument has been presented elsewhere, it is sufficient to summarise some core 
problems here:  
i) Rigorous 'double blinding' provides important social protection in drugs trials. Its purpose 
is to remove the influence of human subjectivity and volition on the part of doctor or patient, 
as well as the power of pharmaceutical companies to influence results. This is impossible in 
education. it is impossible to alter practice without teachers and students noticing. This marks 
a fundamental difference between drugs trials or laboratory experiments and RCTs in 
educational settings. Whereas drugs trials try to eliminate the human factor because 'human 
volition is seen as a contaminator' social change is brought about through the human agent 
(Pawson 2006:27). This lays educational RCTs wide open to expectancy effects and 
Hawthorne effects (Thomas 2016:404).  
ii) Sample choice generally operates in drugs trials to eliminate interference from other 
possible causes. This is not always productive: for example, drugs for heart disease are tested 
out on middle aged men without other ailment, whereas real patients tend to be older, men 
and women, and with comorbidity (comment from Lehman, an experienced GP, cited in 
Greenhalgh 2016). It is unimaginable to eliminate the 'interference' of diverse human 
characteristics from learners. Similarly, randomisation is rare in education RCTs, since 
school classes are generally pre-formed.  
iii) In drugs trials the control group is typically provided with a placebo, in order to judge the 
relative impact of the intervention. This presents immediate problems of ambiguity for 
education: is the control group to do nothing in place of the intervention, or 'business as 
usual'. To take a simple example, in a trial concerning open questions, should the control 
group have entirely closed questions or should the teacher attempt to follow their normal 
habits. As Pawson (2006:51) puts it, 'This is not the world in repose. This is no vacuum... 
Control groups or control areas are in fact kept very busy.' 
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All of the above procedures serve to regularise and simplify in order to isolate the impact of a 
single 'intervention' whilst keeping everything else constant. They are the analogy to the 
procedures in laboratory experiments which stabilise other variables; they transform the 
openness and complexity of real situations into a closed system. Experimental procedures 
seek to de-activate other forces which might negate, distort strengthen or weaken the factor 
under investigation. Of course, some open systems in nature (eg the weather) are beyond the 
power of experiments to close and simplify. This is arguably the case with most social 
situations (Pawson 2006:18) including educational ones (Biesta 2010:496).  
Rather than considering RCTs to be the 'gold standard' of research, we need to consider the 
frequency with which problems occur and are not resolved. In a study of mathematics 
curriculum RCTs, Ginsburg and Smith (2016:ii) identify 12 different threats to accuracy and 
usefulness. These include:  
 authors having an association with the curriculum's developer 
 curriculum interventions being poorly implemented - especially in the first year of 
implementation 
 a failure to identity the comparison curriculum experienced by the control group 
 more instructional time for the treatment than the control group 
 a failure to evaluate longer term impact 
 assessment tools which favour the content of the curriculum package being assessed.  
They conclude that 'the magnitude of the error generated by even a single threat is frequently 
greater than the average effect size of an RCT treatment.' This is not an imaginary problem, 
since Ginsburg and Smith, in their analysis of 27 mathematics RCTs rated highly by the What 
Works Clearinghouse (WWC), found that 26 showed multiple problems which were 
sufficiently serious to make them unreliable (ibid:ii).  
Empiricism, reductionism and Critical Realism 
At this point it is pertinent to probe more deeply into the nature of natural sciences, in order 
to understand the flaws in how 'evidence-based teaching' works views science: in other 
words, although the appeal to science suggests rigour and objectivity,  it reflects only 
superficial features of natural scientific methodology and principles.   
The implicit assumption of many education-based RCT studies, as commissioned by EEF, is 
empiricism. There is scant regard for questions of causality. As an example, a major report on 
action to remedy literacy problems in 11-12 year olds (Gorard et al 2016) does not ask what 
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those problems might be; it is framed entirely in empirical measurement of the effectiveness 
of a particular program; the concern is simply to identify 'what works' without really grasping 
why. Moreover, in reporting source research projects and systematic reviews, the EEF 
summaries and technical appendices effectively hide from view any discussion of causality. 
Whilst to some advocates of the 'What works' philosophy this may seem adequate, it is hardly 
a scientific approach. Natural sciences are built upon the development of theory, with a 
reiterative interplay between observation, explanation and testing. This crucially requires an 
understanding of causal powers, predictability and generalisability and not merely regularity.  
The tacit assumption is that regularity is as far as one needs to go in pursuit of 'what works'. 
Despite Hume's (1748: section VII) insistence that repeated occurrences can never establish 
causality, pragmatically he was content to act as if they did, and assumed that science was 
basically trustworthy. Similarly, despite the general agreement among statisticians and social 
scientists that 'correlation does not imply causality', the term 'effect size' suggests the 
opposite; indeed many research reports of this kind speak casually of X 'having an effect on' 
Y, despite the absence of a causal explanation or even the requirement for X to occur before 
Y. This problem is addressed strongly by Gorard and See (2013:22) 
One of the most noticeable themes from conducting a series of research syntheses is 
how frequently research reports use strong causal terms to describe their findings, 
without any apparent justification. Abbot (1998, 149) complained that 'an unthinking 
causalism today pervades our journals', because correlation, pattern or even opinion 
was too often described in strong causal terms... a major problem is authors mis-
describing correlations as causal, through forgetting that statistical modelling, 
including multi-level modelling, structural equation modelling and path analyses 
merely find sophisticated correlations.  
The same authors argues that four criteria are need to establish the feasibility of a causal 
model: 
 repeated association - the association must be 'strong, clearly observable, replicable and it 
must be specific to X and Y' 
 sequence (X must always precede Y), and 'the appearance of Y must be safely predictable 
from the appearance of X)' 
 measurable linked changes - 'an intervention to change the  strength or appearance of X... 
also strongly and clearly changes the strength or appearance of Y' 
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 a coherent mechanism - 'the simplest available without w hich the evidence cannot be 
explained'. (Gorard and See 2013:4, quoting Gorard 2013).  
Bhaskar and researchers in the Critical Realist tradition also insist on causal mechanisms, 
though they are more doubtful about the above appeal to regularity, replication and 
transparency. Their model is based on a frequent disjunction between the 'real', the 'actual' 
and the 'phenomenal'. We may not experience or observe what happens, and moreover 
underlying forces (the 'deep real') may fail to actualise in open systems. Thus, causal forces 
belong to the 'deep' reality, and may be triggered or blocked by other forces or by aspects of 
the environment in which they attempt to materialise (see for example Bhaskar 1978, Sayer 
2000:10-19).  
Consequently measuring regularities is insufficient for science; attentive observation is an 
essential part of the process of looking beyond surface features. 
Although the other physical and biological sciences have achieved great advances by 
supplementing observation with controlled experimentation, qualitative observation 
plays a critical and foundation role in every scientific area in the formation of theory 
and hypotheses, the design of research projects, and the exploration of new frontiers. 
(Lingenfelter 2016:114) 
Similarly Hammersley (2015:4) makes the point that 'in the drug field, RCTs are used as a 
complement to laboratory work, which will have produced a considerable body of knowledge 
about the drug' whereas  'in social fields RCTs are usually expected to provide the whole 
scientific knowledge base for the "treatment"'.  
We should note that medical research is saturated with theory: 
Medical treatments... are the embodiment of years of theory-testing. They are already 
scientific inquiry incarnate before the first Phase III RCT is even designed. By this 
stage, medical science knows pretty well how a treatment works and it entrusts to the 
RCT a slightly different question about how well it works in a particular 
manifestation. Whole episodes of pure science are played out, and their lessons 
digested, before the applied science kicks in. (Pawson 2006:47) 
In the natural sciences, scientific theorising operates in conjunction with various forms of 
experimentation and observation to lead to reliable causal understandings.  
Natural scientists don't slavishly pursue methodological formulae about establishing 
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causation. They infer, based on their prior knowledge, their critical observation, their 
conjecture, and their testing of these conjectures, in a process that has come to be 
called by philosophers of science inference to the best explanation. (Thomas 
2016:406) 
We can contrast this with an explanation of scientific methodology from Tom Bennett, a 
well-known advocate of RCTs and meta-analysis who appears to regard them as the only 
valid 'scientific' form of educational research. Bennett seems to regard experiments as a 
faithful reflection or re-enactment of reality, and portrays the process of designing 
experiments / trials as moving along smoothly from data or casual observations without 
theory, or indeed anything more than a superficial sequential hypothesis.  
If I apply a Bunsen flame to water, I may be surprised (because I am an idiot) to see it 
bubble and vanish (let's call it 'boil') when it gets to 100 degrees Celsius. If I propose 
that this is a routine event, and every time I do the same I obtain the same result, then 
I can reasonably be said to have a good piece of scientific explanation.  
Science normally proceeds on this formula:  
 Form a question: does sound travel faster in water than in air?  
 Make a hypothesis: yes it does. 'Sound travels faster in water than air.' 
 Make a prediction: what would I observe if my hypothesis were true? Well, for a start, 
perhaps I would hear a noise more quickly underwater than I would on land.  
 Test the prediction: gather evidence to see if the real world behaves the same way as 
your prediction. Get your flippers on.  
 Analysis: what does the evidence show? What do we need to do next? and if the 
evidence proves the hypothesis to be false, what new hypothesis can we suggest? 
(Bennett 2013:21) 
The role of theory in scientific work is trivialised in this description. The importance of this 
quotation, in the present conjuncture, is that Bennett, as founder and organiser of the 
ResearchED conferences, has considerable influence among teachers and with government.  
Statistical synthesis 
Natural science is cumulative but not in a simplistic sense of piling up data. It depends on the 
ability to construct coherent bodies of knowledge. This requires not only gathering a body of 
evidence to support (or refute) key ideas, but also critical challenges to dominant paradigms 
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when the evidence is inconsistent or contradictory. Scientists do not operate by averaging the 
results of multiple experiments.   
Evidence-based teaching also attempts to build a body of knowledge. It depends not only on 
RCTs, as the first level of research, but on the synthesis of multiple primary studies. However 
rather than a critical review of available research studies, it relies on a particular form of 
review known as meta-analysis. Although the best do include a critical review of the source 
studies, the core procedure, in most education studies at least, is based on averaging the effect 
sizes of the primary research studies. Although the starting point for this involves a process of 
selection, the central procedure consists of calculating a mean effect size, albeit sometimes 
with weighting. Effect size (ES) is assumed to be a measure of how much more effective the 
treatment or intervention is than the control group's experience. Effect sizes are standardised 
by dividing by the standard deviation.  
There are many problems with these assumptions. Indeed Simpson (2017, 2018) challenges 
the very concept of effect size in this context, pointing out that it is an indicator of how well a 
trial is designed to make an effect visible, not the effectiveness of the intervention. He points 
to three major problems:  
i) there is a lack of clarity about the control group's activity (as above) 
ii) research based on a limited population (eg 11-year-old boys with reading difficulties) 
reduces the heterogeneity of the sample and consequently magnifies the 'effect size' 
iii) using outcome measures closely related to the nature of the intervention magnifies the 
effect size, compared with a more general assessment tool.  
Such problems only get worse when the mean effect sizes of multiple meta-analyses are 
compared with one another. Hattie's Visible Learning project is undoubtedly the best known 
example globally. His statistical calculations have been subject to powerful critique (eg 
Bergeron and Rivard 2017; Snook et al 2009; Brown 2013; Orange 2014; Literacy in 
Leafstrewn 2012; with a comprehensive guide to other critiques in Lilley 2016). To 
summarise some key points: 
 no account is taken of the length of each intervention 
 nor of the tendency for average effect sizes to reduce as children get older 
 sometimes Hattie uses effect size to mean 'compared to a control group' and elsewhere to 
mean 'as compared with the same students before the study started'   
 there are frequent doubts about the directionality of influence between factors 
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 studies measuring the effect on grades are mixed in with studies about the percentage of 
students graduating 
 the impact of interventions on self-esteem, as estimated by the students, are mixed in with 
studies measured by attainment.  
Similar problems occur in the EEF Toolkit, which uses a similar procedure but is presented 
within a different 'shell', namely a list of 35 types of intervention each with three pieces of 
data:  
 mean effect size translated into 'additional months of progress' 
 cost 
 strength of evidence.  
This enables the list to be re-sorted in various ways, though the most obvious is by months of 
progress. 
Essentially these aggregations of research (meta-analysis and meta-meta-analyses) are less 
than scientific. It should be noted that many of the syntheses which the EEF draws on 
combine statistical averaging with a verbal review of source studies, and some of the 
discussion is well theorised, but unfortunately most of this disappears in the EEF reports. 
Some of these problems are acknowledged in the EEF Toolkit's Technical Appendices 
(Higgins et al 2012), though the school heads that this is meant for are likely to be too busy to 
notice.  
Perhaps the most important problem with both the Toolkit and Visible Learning is that the 
selection process for source documents takes place on technical grounds, without seriously 
considering underlying theories, the context, or indeed whether the interventions are 
sufficiently similar. Radically dissimilar studies are often aggregated to produce a mean 
effect size - a problem known in the literature as 'Apples and Oranges'. There is little regard 
to differences of context (students' ages, curriculum areas, prior attainment levels etc.) This 
goes against the warning from Gene Glass, originator of the idea of meta-analysis, 
concerning heterogeneity: 
Our biggest challenge is to tame the wild variation in our findings not by decreeing 
this or that set of standard protocols but by describing and accounting for the 
variability in our findings. The result of a meta-analysis should never be an average; 
it should be a graph (Glass in Robinson 2004:29, my italics).  
Sports participation: a case study 
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To illustrate some of these problems, let us consider, as a case study, the EEF's report on the 
impact of sports participation (EEF 2018). (This is just one of many possible illustrations. 
See, for example, Wrigley 2018 for comments on Feedback and Teaching Assistants, or the 
many other sections referred to in Simpson, 2017.) Admittedly the notes in the Sports 
Participation section acknowledge the extreme variability of effect sizes in the source 
research, yet somehow an average is derived. 
As previously explained, at the Toolkit's top level, we see a table which can be arranged in 
terms of Impact (expressed as Additional Months of Progress). The table ranges from +8 
months for Feedback to -4 months for Repeating a Year. Sports Participation is given an 
impact score of +2 months, summarised as 'low impact for moderate cost'.  
Drilling down a level, we find that 'the overall impact of sports participation on academic 
achievement tends to be positive but low'. It should be noted that this is an instrumental 
perspective, i.e. the impact which sports participation has on academic attainment (exams, 
test scores). The value of sports participation as enjoyment, or indeed other possible benefits 
such as fitness or fair play, is not considered. Sports participation might also have an indirect 
impact on achievement by promoting a positive ethos within a school, but this would not 
register in RCT-style studies with pre- and post-tests in academic skills over a relatively short 
time frame. Despite the low average impact of 2 months, an exception is allowed:  
Sports participation can have a larger effect on, for example,  mathematics learning 
when combined with a structured numeracy programme (with one study showing an 
impact of up to ten months' additional progress). In this circumstance the 
'participation' acted as an incentive to undertake additional instruction.  
Further detail can be found by drilling down further to the Technical Appendix. The EEF 
toolkit summary effect size for sports participation (0.17, roughly two months) comes from 
averaging four effect sizes, derived from three meta-analyses. It would appear as if the EEF 
has undertaken some weighting to obtain this average (since the unweighted average is 0.31) 
but this is not made clear. For one of the three meta-analyses (Newman et al 2010) two 
different effect sizes are supplied, one for ‘academic outcomes’ and one for ‘mathematics’, 
with no explanation for why these two were selected from a longer list. Thus the procedures 
by which meta-analyses are combined to give a meta-meta-analytic mean effect size are 
opaque. 
The figure of 0.17 derives from  
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0.10 (Lewis 2004) 
0.15  (Shulruf 2010 
0.19 for Academic Outcomes and 0.80 for Mathematics (Newman et al 2010).  
Only the most determined reader, among busy headteachers, is likely to download the 
original research review by Newman et al to discover that the 0.80 refers to one specific 
sports-related intervention.  
We need to drill down a further stage to the original research report to get a glimpse of why it 
might have been so successful. We discover that the highly successful program reported in 
Newman et al (2010) is Playing for Success. This initiative involved establishing study 
support centres at prestigious soccer grounds (Sharp et al 2003). Strictly speaking it was not 
an RCT as participants self-selected by volunteering, and then teachers decided which pupils 
should go forward. Underachieving pupils from local schools spent a total of 20 hours at the 
sports club. They enjoyed a boost to status and self-esteem through meeting star players, 
visiting the club's museum and boardroom, etc. The intervention was well resourced, 
including one-to-one mentoring and dedicated ICT suites. They had a personalised 
curriculum adapted to their individual needs in literacy, numeracy and ICT skills. Moreover, 
it was designed round practical and situated activities which were meaningful to the pupils: 
mathematics trails; counting the seats and measuring the pitch; using gate receipts and sales 
in the shop, restaurant and kiosks for work on numeracy and data handling; writing match 
reports; researching and writing player biographies; compiling a sports magazine or match 
programme; using sports-themed tasks to learn how to search the internet.  
Playing for Success was highly successful not only for maths but for literacy and ICT skills, 
although the additional progress in maths had the edge. Although the program only lasted six 
months (a total of 20 hours) for each pupil, the upper primary school pupils averaged 15 
months progress in reading and the early secondary pupils averaged 8 months. In numeracy 
the results were even more startling - over 20 months for some cohorts. By contrast, we are 
informed, the matched 'control group' pupils typically made no progress, slipping further 
behind the achievement expected for their age.  
Interviews showed how the pupils had previously tended to get stuck with basic concepts at 
schools, lost confidence and stopped trying. When participating in the scheme, on the other 
hand, they became more successful independent learners, and used resources to meet their 
particular needs. The research evaluation reports show that they were highly motivated by the 
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football club context and felt 'privileged to be chosen to participate, rather than stigmatised as 
in need of extra help. Pupils who attend are given an opportunity that makes them the envy of 
their friends.' Positive attitudes were sustained a year later (Sharp et al 2003:113-120).  
It is our contention that this level of causal explanation is needed if research on 'what works' 
is truly to inform school development. It is no use simply ascribing success to ‘sports 
participation’ as an incentive to receive further instruction in maths', as in the EEF summary.  
A further look at the three meta-analyses drawn on by EEF (Newman; Lewis; Shulruf) shows 
extensive potential for the method of synthesising research to mislead. Newman et al (2010) 
reports the above programme (Sharp et al 2003) as one of six on sports participation, but four 
of the other five are problematic or irrelevant. One of them had a sample of only 15 pupils; 
two focused on the benefit of martial arts when compared to traditional school sports, not the 
benefit of sport participation over non-participation; one is about self-discovery through 
massage and yoga.  
The meta-study by Lewis (2004) is a US-based doctoral dissertation comparing a variety of 
forms of extracurricular activities. One of these groups is Sports combined with 
Cheerleading, reporting a mean effect size of 0.1. The report carries a warning about 'self-
selection bias':  
It is difficult and dangerous to make assumptive statements about the benefits of 
participation if the children who are involved in activities are so fundamentally 
different from those who do not. Pre-existing differences, rather than the influence of 
participation, may account for the gains in social competence, esteem, and 
achievement. (p85) 
The third meta-study (Shulruf 2010) covers a wide range of extracurricular activities (ECA) 
and not only sports. Its warnings are even more explicit. Indeed its main aim is not to 
measure the impact of sports participation (and other extracurricular activities) on attainment 
but to critique the assumption that a causal relationship has been found. Many of its sources 
rely on secondary data; they compare retrospectively the average attainment of pupils who 
engaged in extracurricular activities while at school with those who didn't. The report's major 
conclusion reaffirms the distinction between correlation and causality, and proposes a set of 
criteria for determining causality, including whether multiple causes might be at work, 
whether the association operates under different conditions and whether there is coherence 
with current knowledge. Applying these to extracurricular activities, it points out that:  
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... Overall, although some associations could be identified between participation in 
ECA and a number of students’ outcomes, there was no robust evidence for causal 
effects relating to these associations. Until causality can be shown, how best to 
enhance positive school-related outcomes through ECA will remain unclear. (p607) 
The final conclusion reads as follows:  
The results show associations rather than causation and raise major concerns 
regarding the validity of some of the data and analyses used in the literature. This 
leads to the conclusion that the current knowledge on ECA participation does not 
suggest that extracurricular activities affect student educational outcomes either 
positively or negatively. It is therefore considered essential that further research be 
carried out to unravel how participation in ECA contributes to students’ outcomes and 
why. Such research should investigate aspects of participation including what 
motivates participation, how and why students participate, and how such participation 
impacts on their outcomes. (p609) 
This raises major questions about the 'scientific' nature of statistical meta-analysis and meta-
meta-analysis.  Calculating mean effect sizes is not a substitute for investigating causal 
mechanisms and the environments in which they activate (or don't).  
The above example provides a good illustration of the conclusion drawn by Pawson:  
At every stage of the meta-analytic review, simplifications are made. Hypotheses are 
abridged, studies are dropped, programme details are filtered out, contextual 
information is eliminated, selected findings are utilized, averages are taken, estimates 
are made... In this purgative progress the very features that explain how interventions 
work are eliminated from the reckoning. Complex programmes are cast as simple 
treatments. The way in which stakeholders think and change their thinking under an 
intervention is expunged. (2006:42-3) 
Conclusion 
It might appear that the discussion in the preceding section is petty and quarrelsome. Such a 
detailed analysis is only necessary because of frequent claims that the procedures in statistical 
syntheses such as Visible Learning and the Toolkit are 'scientific'. Indeed, the numerical 
presentation of results as effect sizes or additional months of progress creates the illusion of 
reliability and accuracy.  
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There are various dangers in the argument presented in this article. It could be read to suggest 
that research is of no practical benefit to teachers, because they have sufficiency of evidence 
gained from their own practice. This is a mistake, since research, including RCTs, can serve 
to challenge established professional habit. It can also highlight alternatives, though there are 
many forms of research which do that better than RCTs and meta-analysis (Wrigley 2018:16; 
Pawson 2006:50).  
RCTs can be conducted without abandoning the search for theoretical and causal 
explanations. However, to do so they have to transcend an empiricist and instrumentalist 
'what works?' mentality and engage in the classic scientific question 'What is going on?' 
(Rømer 2014:112). Similarly, it is important to hold onto a broader, more explanatory and 
exploratory tradition of evaluating a wide body of evidence through research reviews, and 
which select source studies on the basis of theory and relevance and not just technical 
conformity. (Indeed, the discussion sections of the reviews which the EEF Toolkit draws 
upon for its statistical data are often a better guide than its aggregate effect sizes. An 
excellent example is the discussion contained in the review by See and Kokotsaki (2015) 
cited within the Toolkit's Arts Participation strand.)   
Essentially RCTs and meta-analyses tend to take at face value the empirical data, regarding 
this as sufficient for causal explanation. It is important to note Bhaskar's (1978) critique of 
empiricism, a critique which requires us to hold a distance between the phenomena we 
perceive and 'deep causes'. In open systems, many factors are at work which may activate or 
negate each other; deep forces may not actualise or become perceptible. If we are to move 
beyond rhetorical appeals and take scientific enquiry seriously, research literacy must extend 
beyond registering outcomes and actually engage with the complex and situated powers 
which may produce those outcomes. Teachers need to be engaged with research processes in 
their fullness, including focused observation, hypothesis, critical reflection on data, and 
clarification of aims and concepts.  
At the risk of stating the obvious, educational research methods have to keep in mind the 
nature and purpose of education itself (Thomas 2012). Biesta powerfully argues that 
pedagogical activity involves 'open, recursive, semiotic' systems which linear mechanistic 
models cannot reflect.  
 Such conditions can be described as those of closed systems: systems that are in a 
state of being isolated from their environment. Open systems, on the other hand, are 
 19 
systems that are characterised by a degree of interaction with their environment. 
Whereas closed systems operate deterministically, open systems operate at most 
probabilistically. Recursive systems are systems that in some way feed back into 
themselves, so that the behaviour of the system is the result of a combination of 
external factors and internal dynamics. Semiotic systems are systems that do not 
operate through physical force but through the exchange of meaning. (Biesta 
2010:496) 
It is not scientific to treat open systems as if they were closed ones, or social situations as if 
they were biological phenomena.  
Rømer (2014:114) relates Denmark's sudden policy conversion to 'evidence-based teaching' 
to a wider configuration of globalised neoliberal education governance, in which 'rankings 
are supposed to provide information to the global marketplace'. Thus evidence becomes a 
'member of a family of concepts surrounding and aiding the processes of global capitalism.' 
Citing Pedersen (2011:172): 
For the first time in more than 160 years of school history, the school does not have as 
its primary task the formation of the individual as a citizen or a member of a 
democracy, but instead, the instruction of the pupil as a 'soldier' in the competition 
among nations. The school must now primarily promote a notion of individual 
competition, and is only secondarily based on the ideals of a more democratic society.  
Whereas in drugs trials success criteria tend to be unidimensional and relatively 
unproblematic (e.g. pain reduction, a definitive cure, survival), education is marked by a 
multiplicity of aims - acquisition of factual knowledge, skilled performance, problem solving, 
longer-term cognitive development, aesthetic or ethical qualities, socialisation. An insistence 
on 'evidence' in the sense of numerical data (effect sizes) easily leads towards the neglect of 
most of these in favour of more easily measured ones such as factual knowledge acquisition 
and lower order understandings. A tight view of 'evidence' risks distorting curricular 
decisions and pedagogic practice, and abandoning such values and aims as world citizenship, 
multiculturalism, enlightenment, democracy, solidarity, character, virtue, knowledge and 
Bildung (Rømer 2014: 115).  
Ironically, in the English situation at least, organisations such as ResearchEd and EEF, in 
their different ways, claim to empower practitioners through research literacy, yet promote 
and perpetuate a one-dimensional view of research, whilst marginalising broader forms of 
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research. Data is presented in such a way that users are seduced into prescriptive 
interpretations of the evidence available. These movements promote simplified analyses of 
complex data, leading users to look for simple generic solutions to complex situated 
problems.    
There is a loop between a narrow view of research and evidence and a narrow understanding 
and practice of pedagogy. Carol Black (2018), in her very powerful essay 'Science / Fiction', 
relates the vogue for debunking wider research traditions to political and educational 
conservatism and a transmission model of education. Inadequate notions based on shallow 
understandings of 'science' are performative and reinforce narrow versions of curriculum and 
pedagogy. In the name of 'science' and in conjunction with the dynamics of high-stakes 
accountability systems, we are witnessing an anti-enlightenment closing down of ways of 
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